IPv6 security on IPv4-only networks
Slippery Floor
Even though IPv6 is not establishing itself as expected, it is still making progress. More and more systems on the Internet, as well as on enterprise networks, can communicate and are accessible via IPv6. Mechanisms such as auto-configuration and automatic tunneling mean that IPv6-capable nodes will attempt to establish connections using IPv6. Filtering of IPv6 traffic or the lack of end-to-end connectivity can cause the connection to fail. In this case, the node either cancels the communication action or it tries after failing – and typically after a timeout – to use IPv4 as a fallback mechanism to reach its target, resulting in pronounced delays and unsatisfactory behavior of the IT infrastructure.
Two IPv6 security experts, Fernando Gont (SI6 Networks) and Will Liu (Huawei Technologies), summarized important principles for securing IPv4-only networks in RFC 7123 (Security Implications of IPv6 on IPv4 Networks) [1]. This request for comment still has an "Informational" status, and is thus intended as a basis for discussion and as a guideline for practical applications. In contrast to standard-track RFCs, it is not mandatory.
IPv6 in IPv4-Only Networks
Ever since Windows Vista, IPv6 has been integrated into the Windows TCP/IP stack and enabled by default. To put this another way: Windows always runs in dual-stack mode first, with IPv4 and IPv6 running in parallel (Figure 1). The Linux kernel has supported IPv6 for many years, and nearly all distributors enable it by default. Because of various IPv6 features, such as automatic configuration, transition, and translation technologies (in particular, automatic tunneling), attackers can exploit IPv6 traffic on dual-stack nodes.
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