Credential management with HashiCorp Vault

Key Master

Depending on a company's security paradigm, the admin team members share a joint account or assign admin rights to personal accounts. In the first case, each member must know the account's shared password. This sometimes leads to unfortunate situations when an established employee leaves the team or even the company. In the second case, the administrators handle all their daily tasks with a user account that has rights far above normal levels.

Additionally, the use of cloud infrastructure along with dynamic resource management is geared to the actual needs of the respective services. In high-utilization situations, instances added at short notice carry out the necessary calculations. User accounts for databases or APIs in such dynamic environments typically share secret keys for encrypting communication or access to shared filesystems. Each password is then stored in a widely available configuration file that is used when setting up the instance for configuration. Alternatively, the shared admin password is used to log in and the remaining configurations are semiautomatic.

In both scenarios, different instances use the same secrets to perform the work to be done. On the one hand, this leads to accountability issues for the work performed – for example, traceability: Who logged into the administrative account on a system and when? If cloud instances have the same access credentials for database access, it is impossible to determine unambiguously which instance is responsible for errors or malicious actions. On the other hand, existing structures can change after distributing the secrets. This results in new problems: What happens to the old password? Do you need to equip all systems with a new password or is it sufficient to do this for future instances?